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Abstract 
This paper tests whether the so-called ‘reach of the market’ helps 
to explain ‘why Europe’ and ‘why north-western Europe’. By 
looking at grain markets from the late seventeenth to the early 
twentieth century, this study concludes that the process of 
commodity market integration pre-dated the take-off in the late 
eighteenth or early nineteenth century, so it was neither a 
concomitant nor an effect of the Industrial Revolution, but indeed 
a plausible determinant for the rise of Europe. When looking at 
differences within Europe, it finds that in terms of economic 
integration, there were two distinct zones in early modern Europe 
– landlocked and lowland Europe. In the latter, markets clearly 
extended to much bigger geographical areas before the arrival of 
steam transportation and the creation of extensive road 
networks, which can be explained by physical geography that 
had endowed lowland Europe with easier and cheaper 
transportation. 
 
 
Introduction 
The idea that the reach of the market is associated through the 
division of labour with the level of economic development, and that the 
expansion of markets, that is, the process of market integration, leads to 
economic growth, has made Adam Smith one of the best known 
economists of all time. It has also become one of the most popular 
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explanations for economic development since Smith first asserted that 
connection more than 200 years ago. 
In a nutshell, the logic of the argument runs as follows. When, for 
some reason, market areas expand and formerly separated markets 
become part of one single market, their integration turns them into a 
single operating entity. This generates a territorial expansion of the 
division of labour, inducing a re-allocation of resources within regions or 
national economies, leading to an increasing division of labour. Through 
the specialisation of skills, this will eventually improve the general 
productivity and thus induce economic growth.1 
But through other channels than the pooling and accumulation of 
skills, market integration can lead to further economic gains. Among 
these are increased information flows that encourage technological 
spillovers and diffusions2, enhanced competition, and increasing returns 
to scale.3 
Intuitively, this notion of Smithian, or trade-led growth more 
generally is certainly very persuasive, so it is understandable that it has 
been hugely popular in academia and politics alike. And if economic 
development is in the eyes of many so inextricably linked to the extent of 
the market, surely we also know exactly just how big the markets for the 
various production factors and the various products have extended at 
most times in history, and where and how this impacted on economic 
progress. Well, not quite. The empirical evidence on when and how 
markets became integrated, and on whether, when, and under what 
                                                            
1 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; see for 
instance Kelly, ‘The Dynamics of Smithian Growth’ for an overview and an application 
to economic history. 
2 See for instance Keller, ‘Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-related?’; Coe and 
Helpman, ‘International R&D Spillovers’. 
3 Krugman and Venables, ‘Globalisation and the Inequality of Nations’; Romer, 
‘Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth’. 
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circumstances expanding markets promoted economic growth, is actually 
amazingly thin and often remains ambiguous.4  
Empirical studies on the link between trade and economic growth 
have nearly exclusively concentrated on the post-World War II period, 
which is understandable, as good macroeconomic data only becomes 
available in this period.5 But is the trade-led growth hypothesis also 
supported by pre-World War II evidence? Does it, most importantly, stand 
up to the ultimate test, that is, does it help to explain the most 
fundamental growth story in the history of mankind, namely the Industrial 
Revolution? Does market integration help to explain why it was Europe 
that led the economic development in the world and industrialised first? 
Does it give us a clue about why, within Europe, it was its North-western 
part that spearheaded the ‘rise of Europe’? Fact is: we do not really know. 
Surely, processes of economic change of such a monumental scale 
can hardly have mono-causal explanations. Indeed, standard accounts 
include among the prerequisites and concomitants of the Industrial 
Revolution commercial, institutional, social, intellectual, scientific, 
financial, agricultural, and political changes. While some economic 
historians see these factors as a ‘seamless web of historical change’, 
economist seeking to explain the phenomenon might call this a 
prototypical endogeneity problem, where a whole array of variables are 
mutually influencing each other and changing simultaneously in the 
process.6   
In this ‘web’ of factors, priorities and weights are assigned very 
differently, with trade and commercialisation, geography, colonialism, 
                                                            
4 See for instance McMahon and Squire, Explaining growth. 
5 See for instance Frankel and Romer, ‘Does Trade Cause Growth’ or Dinoupoulos and 
Segerstrom, ‘A Theory of North-South Trade and Globalisation’. Acemoglu and his co-
authors are a notable exception here; but they work with very few and shaky data 
points. Acemoglu et al., ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’ and ‘The 
Rise of Europe’. 
6 Quote from Cameron, A Concise Economic History of the World, p. 167. 
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religion, institutions, human capital and coal among the most popular 
contenders for being key determinants for historical change. While some 
view markets as quite irrelevant for the process, overall, trade and 
increasing markets and the ensuing process of commercialisation are 
among the factors most often credited with being important driving forces 
for this ‘rise of Europe’. Yet even in these accounts, there is profound 
disagreement about the extent of trade and about how and indeed when it 
actually impacted on European economic development. So the 
assessments about the role of market integration on Europe’s 
industrialisation range from negligible to central. 7 
The plausibility of whether trade-led growth played a crucial role for 
the Industrial Revolution in Europe hinges on whether Europe 
experienced a process of market integration prior to, or at least 
accompanying, its economic ‘take off’ in the late eighteenth century. 
Unfortunately, there is little agreement about when the process of 
European market integration began, about the extent of trade and market 
integration at various points in early modern Europe, or about the 
comparative levels of economic integration Europe had reached relative 
to the rest of the world. This uncertainty about whether the preconditions 
for trade-led growth were met explains why the assessments about the 
importance of market integration for the rise of Europe contrast so starkly. 
This piece of research wants to do away with that uncertainty. It 
tries to overcome some of the problems of the market integration 
literature that leave us with this unclear picture and tries to sketch the 
reach of the market and the process of market integration in Europe from 
                                                            
7 For some classical accounts on the Industrial Revolution and the ‘rise of Europe’, see 
Ashton, The Industrial Revolution; Landes, The Unbound Prometheus and The Wealth 
and Poverty of Nations; Mokyr, The British Industrial Revolution. For works that see 
some very clear key determinants, see for instance: religion: Weber, The Protestant 
ethic and the spirit of capitalism; geography: Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel; coal 
and colonialism: Pomeranz, The Great Divergence; institutions: North and Thomas, 
The Rise of the Western World; knowledge and human capital: Mokyr, ‘The Intellectual 
Origins of Modern Economic Growth’. 
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well before until well after the start of the Industrial Revolution. By doing 
this, it tries to determine whether, in light of evidence from the most 
decisive shift in economic development, the trade-led hypothesis that 
features so prominently in the growth literature remains plausible. The 
aim here is not to supplant the existing explanations of the Industrial 
Revolution, but to ascertain whether and how one particular growth factor 
that appears in many explanations – the so-called ‘reach of the market’ – 
has contributed to this rise. In other words: Does market integration help 
to explain ‘why Europe’ and ‘why north-western Europe’? Has market 
integration proceeded the take-off, has it been a concomitant or was it 
merely a consequence of it, as the mainstream opinion – the ‘Big Bang 
assumption’ – has it? 
The investigation starts with an overview of the literature on 
potential links between market expansion and the rise of Europe, and 
shows the huge existing discrepancies when assessing the importance of 
trade as a growth factor. Thereafter, we look at how some crucial 
shortcomings of the market integration literature, which to large degree 
generate these uncertainties, can be overcome and what historical 
evidence has been gathered to do so. The two following sections 
describe the new approaches and the quantitative results they yield.  
Section six provides some historical narrative and the logic behind the 
results obtained and section seven concludes. 
 
 
1. Trade Expansion and the Rise of Europe 
As stated above, the plausibility of whether Smithian, or trade-led 
growth more generally played a crucial role for the Industrial Revolution in 
Europe hinges on whether Europe experienced a process of market 
integration prior to, or at least accompanying, its economic ‘take off’ in the 
late eighteenth century. A number of empirical studies indeed do find 
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evidence that this was the case, pointing to the eighteenth century as a 
period of increasing market integration.8 Consistent with these findings, it 
is argued that market integration was one of the key driving factors for 
structural change and economic growth in early modern Europe. Since 
technological change remained fairly limited in this period, it was the 
process of market expansion, facilitated by more efficient institutions and 
followed by an increasingly interregional and international division of 
labour, which is seen as the key to increases in productivity in the period 
before the Industrial Revolution.9 
Not so, argues another body of literature, simply because European 
markets became integrated much earlier. According to Gregory Clark, 
English markets were well developed by the 1500s, while Abel and 
Achilles date the emergence of well developed markets to the sixteenth 
and early-seventeenth centuries. So why did Europe not take off then but 
only centuries later? Surely, neither can integrated markets explain the 
rise of Europe in the eighteenth century, nor can the slow growth in the 
centuries before be blamed on poorly developed markets. We must look 
elsewhere for the causes of modern economic growth.10 
Wrong again, is the view of more recent authors. Market integration 
can indeed not have been central for explaining the Industrial Revolution, 
not because well developed markets developed much earlier, but 
because they only emerged after 1800, when the Industrial Revolution 
was already well under way. Focusing on long-distance trade, both intra-
European and intercontinental, they conclude that trade in early modern 
                                                            
8 Persson, Grain Markets in Europe; Unger, ‘Integration of Baltic and Low Countries 
Grain Markets, 1400-1800’; Allen and Unger, ‘The Depth and Breadth of the Market for 
Polish Grain 1500-1800’. 
9 De Vries and van der Woude, The First Modern Economy; Persson, Pre-industrial 
Economic Growth, social organisation and technological progress in Europe; Wrigley, 
Continuity, Chance and Change. 
10 Clark ‘Markets and Economic Growth’; Abel, Agricultural fluctuations in Europe; 
Achilles, Getreidepreise und Getreidehandelsbeziehungen europäischer Räume im 16. 
und 17. Jahrhundert. 
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times was characterised by the exchange of non-competing goods of a 
low bulk-to-value ratio. The surge in trade before 1800 did therefore not 
result in an integration of markets, hence no re-allocation of resources 
and specialisation ensued. The decisive break with the past arguably 
occurred with a ‘Big Bang’ in the nineteenth century, when the steamship 
and the railways lowered transport costs to such an extent that a very 
broad range of commodities, including bulky goods like primary products, 
began to be traded internationally on a large scale. Before the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, there was no widespread and sustained 
process or market integration. Starting in the 1820s, however, there was 
a rapid integration of markets, both within Europe as well as 
internationally. This first wave of globalisation had a dramatic impact on 
the worldwide division of labour and sharply increased productivity and 
rates of economic growth. In these accounts, which have become the 
dominating position, the decades from the 1830s onwards are seen as 
the first and typical era of Smithian growth.11 
On top of the various explanations about how – or indeed how not – 
trade directly impacted on European economic development through 
market integration and Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, there is an array of 
literature about trade-led growth that worked indirectly through channels 
                                                            
11 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did Globalisation Begin?’, ‘After Columbus’, ‘From 
Malthus to Ohlin’; Findlay and O’Rourke, ‘Commodity Market Integration, 1500-2000’; 
Özmucur and Pamuk, ‘Did European commodity prices converge before 1800?’.  A 
very different kind of rebuttal of the centrality of market integration for European 
industrialisation has recently been provided by the comparative analyses of Carol 
Shuie and Wolfgang Keller. Their quantitative evidence suggests that the markets in 
eighteenth-century Europe actually were pretty well integrated. However, they find that 
the degree of market integration was actually comparable in advanced parts of China, 
namely the Yangtze Valley. And since in China no Industrial Revolution ensued, 
markets cannot be the explanation of the rise of Europe. They may be a necessary 
condition, but not a sufficient one for economic development. Shuie and Keller, 
‘Markets in China and Europe’, 2004 and 2007 versions. Shiue and Keller’s paper has 
so far remained the only quantitative piece of research to claim that other regions of the 
world may have had as integrated markets as Europe on the eve of the Industrial 
Revolution. A more recent study comparing Europe with India, the other of the ‘big two’ 
in Asia, concludes that markets were significantly more integrated in Europe compared 
to India: Studer, ‘India and the Great Divergence’. 
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other than proper market integration. Most authors stressing the indirect 
consequence of trade accept the argument that the extent of trade and 
market integration has not been big enough to enable large scale 
specialisation and the reallocation of resources in early modern Europe. 
Yet they argue that the observed increases in specific trading areas and 
the concentration of activities and gains had nevertheless the power to 
induce the ‘rise of Europe’. 
A first variant of a trade induced, but non-Smithian, growth 
explanation is indeed very ‘un-Smithian’: Instead of the invisible hand, it is 
indeed a very visible hand that brings about an international division of 
labour by force. At the core of this position is the international Atlantic 
trade, in particular on the so-called ‘triangular trade’ between Europe 
(largely Britain), Africa and the New World. According to this position, it 
was the profits from the slave trade, which grew to major proportions in 
the eighteenth century with the expansion of sugar, tobacco and cotton 
cultivation on slave plantations in the New World, together with the rise of 
a new division of labour which spurred the Industrial Revolution. The 
outcome of that process was that the British specialised in capital 
intensive and labour-saving production, while the slaves of the New World 
were forced into delivering the complementary labour-intensive 
production side. Thanks to the handsome profits of the Atlantic trade, 
Britain also had the necessary capital to pursue this capital-intensive 
specialisation route, while the New World at the same time increased the 
British selling market and with it the demand for the new British 
manufactured products.12 
                                                            
12 Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, gave rise to this line of arguments; for a current 
overview of the debate surrounding the Williams thesis, see Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic 
Trade and the British Economy 1660-1800. For some very influential work focussing on 
colonialism and world trade: Frank, World accumulation, 1492 – 1789, Wallerstein, The 
Modern World-System. 
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Daron Acemoglu and his co-authors have recently added another 
explanation of how the increasing Atlantic trade induced economic growth 
in Europe in a non-Smithian way. Focussing on the period 1500 to 1850, 
they agree that the rise in overseas trade after Columbus was most likely 
not ‘large enough to have been directly responsible for the process of 
growth in Europe’.13 However, they contend that the rise of the Atlantic 
trade played a central role in the rise of Europe through indirect channels 
influencing institutional developments. In countries with easy access to 
the Atlantic and with non-absolutist initial institutions – England and the 
Netherlands, basically – the surging Atlantic trade generated large and 
concentrated profits for merchants. This thus strengthened commercial 
interests and increased their political power while it had a constraining 
effect on the power of monarchs. This shift of power away from the 
monarchy is believed to have induced significant institutional reforms in 
favour of institutions that were conducive to growth, as they guaranteed 
private property and personal freedom, the rule of law and the prevention 
of excessive spending by the crown. ‘With their newly gained property 
rights, English and Dutch merchants nations invested more, traded more 
and spurred economic growth’.14 
                                                            
13 Acemoglu et al., ‘The Rise of Europe’, p. 550; emphasis added. Partly in reaction to 
the Williams thesis just mentioned, Engerman, ‘The Slave Trade and British Capital 
Formation’ and O’Brien, ‘European Economic Development’ showed that the profits 
from the slave trade only played a modest part in the capital accumulation in Europe. In 
Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England Inikori revised these estimates 
upwards, but there is some agreement that the direct gains from the Atlantic trade were 
relatively rather limited. Also, it is accepted wisdom that maritime overseas trade only 
represented a small share of total trade in Europe, as inter-European land transport 
dominated trade. See, for instance, Irwin, „Comment on ‘Commodity Market 
Integration, 1500-2000’”.  
14 Acemoglu et al., ‘The Rise of Europe’, p. 572. The linkage between trade and 
institutions for explaining the rise of Europe is by no means new, but it is an updated 
variant of the arguments of North and Thomas’ The Rise of the Western World and of 
North and Weingast’s ‘Constitutions and Commitment’. However, the causations 
proposed by Acemoglu now run the other way round, from trade to institutional change, 
while in the earlier formulation better property rights and more liberty were the prime 
movers and led to more trade and growth. Yet since in Acemoglu’s argument the 
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The most recent explanation about how increased trade created the 
Industrial Revolution without a proper integration of markets comes from 
Robert Allen. In his account, England’s commercial success during its 
imperial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enriched 
England and turned London into the trading centre of the world. This 
created a unique structure of wages and prices that set Britain apart from 
the rest of the world. In particular, wages rose above the levels enjoyed in 
any other country, while the price of energy, thanks to Britain’s natural 
endowment in coal, remained low at the same time. This peculiar price 
and wage environment created the incentive to substitute capital and 
energy for labour. Hence it was in England where it paid for inventors to 
invent machines that did exactly that, and it was in England where it paid 
for entrepreneurs to apply this knowledge and for investors to provide the 
money necessary to do so. Consequently, these machines (such as the 
steam engine) were invented and put into use in England, and 
mechanisation and industrialisation got under way.15 
To sum up, this body of literature about the connection between 
increasing trade and the rise of Europe, there is indeed little agreement 
about when the process of European market integration began, about the 
extent of trade and market integration at various points in early modern 
Europe. As scant and ambiguous quantitative evidence leaves large room 
for manoeuvre, it is hardly astonishing that there are also completely 
diverging views on the importance of the expansion of trade for the rise of 
Europe, either as a direct force through the integration of markets and the 
ensuing re-allocation of resources or indirectly through other channels. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
development depends on non-absolutist ‘initial’ institutions, the new version of the 
institutional argument is really only marginally different.  
15 Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. This list of attempts to 
explain the rise of Europe or England with the commercial expansion is by no means 
exhaustive, but focussed on important and distinct contributions.  
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2. Analysing Market Integration in Europe 
It will be argued here that this inconclusive picture regarding the 
reach of the market over time is due to several consistent shortcomings in 
the market integration literature, which can be corrected for. 
The first of these deficiencies of market integration studies for the 
pre-World War I period is the segregation of research in terms of time 
span the various studies cover. The main dividing line is 1800, as most 
studies either focus on the early modern period or on the nineteenth 
century. That is particularly bothering with the present research question 
in mind, as Europe’s rise is dated broadly around that time, so that these 
market integration studies either have their end or starting point around 
the time of the take-off.  
To some degree, this dividing line stems from the different sets of 
qualities needed to study pre-1800 and post-1800 market integration. The 
nineteenth century has certainly attracted by far the most attention, and 
this is certainly due to the availability of data. The abundance and quality 
of economic data that was collected in the nineteenth century, both by the 
authorities as well as private businessmen, is unprecedented in history. 
For earlier periods, records of prices or other variables are much scarcer 
and have rarely been published. Consequently, good data for quantitative 
studies on earlier periods is not just less abundant and often of inferior 
quality, but normally also much more scattered and it is much harder to 
gain access to such sources. No wonder that researchers with good 
quantitative of econometric skills – the ‘data people’ – focus on the 
nineteenth century, while more traditional historians work on the early 
modern period, where qualitative accounts and a sound knowledge of 
archives and sources are much more important.16 Unfortunately, given 
                                                            
16 An example of the former are Jacks, ‘Intra- and International Commodity Market 
Integration’, or O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did Globalisation Begin?’; examples of 
the latter are Unger, ‘Integration of Baltic and Low Countries Grain Markets, 1400-
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the varying abundance and quality of the data and the different analytical 
tools used in their research, direct comparisons of pre- and post-1800 
studies are far from straightforward, thereby blurring the picture about the 
evolution of markets.  
Another problem in the existing literature is its heavy geographical 
bias. Within Europe, special attention has been paid to the first movers – 
England and the Netherlands – as well as to a particular mode of 
transportation, namely maritime or coastal trade, and particular trade 
routes. Taken together, one may speak of a strong bias towards lowland 
Europe and trading centres, including, apart from England and the 
Netherlands, also the Baltic States, the German and Belgian lowlands.17 
This incidentally also applies to studies that attempt to span ‘Europe’ as a 
whole.18 Overland trade in more landlocked territories of Europe has 
attracted relatively little research. With respect to intercontinental trade, 
special attention has in particular been paid to the so-called ‘Atlantic 
trade’, that is to trade flows and market integration between Western 
Europe and the Americas.19 
Yet, despite the aspiration of ‘European’ or ‘global’ coverage of 
some of these studies, maritime and coastal trade was in all probability 
only a relatively small share of both total world trade and total European 
trade. Local, regional and interregional trade were far more important in 
terms of volumes. Accordingly, sea transport was by no means the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1800’ or Abel, Agricultural fluctuations in Europe, and Braudel and Spooner, ‘Prices in 
Europe from 1450 to 1750’. 
17 Unger, ‘Integration of Baltic and Low Countries’; Allen and Unger, ‘The Depth and 
Breadth of the Market for Polish Grain 1500-1800’; Jacks, ‘Market Integration in the 
North and Baltic Seas’; Kopsidis, ‘Market integration and agricultural development’. 
18 Shiue and Keller, ‘Markets in China and Europe’. 
19 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did Globalisation Begin?’, ‘After Columbus’, and 
‘From Malthus to Ohlin’; Acemoglu et al., ‘The Rise of Europe’; Jacks, ‘Intra- and 
International Commodity Market Integration’, ‘What drove nineteenth century 
commodity market integration’, ‘Commodity Market Integration in the Long-Run’; 
Persson, ‘Mind theGap’. 
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dominant mode of transportation, because the lion’s share of 
commodities was transported overland or on inland waterways.20 
A third shortcoming is the bias in terms of distance. So far, most 
studies describing ‘European market integration’ have focused on trade 
over long or very long distances21, while only few quantitative studies on 
regional and interregional market integration exist to date.22 Accordingly, 
a synthesis combining the regional, national and international levels is still 
lacking. This is paramount when assessing the overall history of market 
development, as there may be significant differences in terms of timing, 
extent and trends of market integration on the different spatial scales. And 
as today’s generalisations about the course of European market 
integration largely stem from research on long-distance trade, the current 
picture may not only be incomplete but grossly misleading. One may say 
that this shortcoming is linguistic, as in these studies ‘European market 
integration’ – i.e. the formation of an all-European market – is mostly not 
differentiated from ‘market integration in Europe’, i.e. from the process of 
market expansion on a regional or interregional scale. 
Finally, the studies attempting to provide a ‘European’ picture of 
market integration are still based on relatively small databases. The 
efforts to broaden the quantitative evidence is still very much an ongoing 
project, so that most studies that include the pre-1800 period are normally 
based on the a sample of markets of 5-15 markets, which in an all-
                                                            
20 Irwin, “‘Comment on ‘Commodity Market Integration’”. 
21 See for instance Persson, Grain Markets in Europe; Özmucur and Pamuk, ‘Did 
European commodity prices converge before 1800?’ or again Shiue and Keller's 
‘Markets in China and Europe’. 
22 Some notable exceptions are Kopsidis, ‘Market integration and agricultural 
development’ and  ‘The creation of a Westphalian rye market’, Brandenberger, 
Ausbruch der ‚Malthusianischen Falle’, Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am Bodensee, 
Vögele, Getreidemärkte am Bodensee. 
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European context is not very large and may neither be terribly 
representative nor reliable.23 
Taken together, these limitations and biases in the current market 
integration literature are such that some generalisations may not only be 
incomplete, but actually misleading or plain wrong in some respects. To 
overcome these main deficiencies of the field, a new database of 
historical evidence has been compiled and analysed with these problems 
in mind. 
Thus, here the dividing line of 1800 is avoided by covering the time 
period from 1650-1914 and only including very long data series that can 
be uniformly analysed over the whole period. Like that, all claims can be 
verified, namely whether market integration preceded, accompanied or 
followed the take-off. Also, notwithstanding the debate about the dividing 
line of 1800, most scholars would agree that the reach of the market in 
1650 was, in all parts of the world, local or regional. Also, nobody would 
disagree that by World War I, there were global markets for most 
commodities as well as for capital and to a lesser degree, labour. 
Consequently, the period examined here spans the most dramatic period 
of market expansion in world history in its entirety, as most parts of the 
world witnessed in its course a shift from a regional to a global reach of 
markets.  
Second, the geographical bias which favoured maritime and coastal 
trade, and featured a predominance of north-western Europe or 
prominent trade routes, is overcome. The sample of markets used for the 
present investigation is geographically much more evenly distributed 
across the continent (see Figure 1). In particular, the new database 
                                                            
23 See for instance Shiue and Keller, ‘Markets in China and Europe’; Persson, Grain 
Markets in Europe; and Özmucur and Pamuk, ‘Did European commodity prices 
converge before 1800?’ 
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includes many markets in the interior of Europe, a region that had 
previously been neglected.24 
Third, instead of exclusively focussing on long-distance trade, 
market integration on all distance ranges shall be investigated, which 
ought to give us a much more complete picture of the expansion of 
market areas.  
Finally, the new database not only covers a longer time period and 
features a more balanced set of markets in terms of geography and 
distance, but it is also substantially bigger than in most previous studies. 
This newly collected database consists of commodity, more specifically 
grain, prices. These annual average prices for calendar years are for 
wheat, or in some cases for spelt, which is a special type of wheat that 
was, especially in the early modern period, the predominant grain in parts 
of Europe’s interior. In total, this extended grain price data base for the 
market towns shown in Figure 1 includes price series for 45 markets 
across Europe, encompassing the period from 1650 to 1914. The 
average number of years a price series continuously covers is 145, the 
minimum number and maximum numbers being 47 and 264, respectively. 
When compiling the database, many of these price series were 
taken from the secondary literature and, thanks to recent scholarship, 
many are even available online and in standardised form that makes 
them comparable internationally.25 Considerably less data was readily 
                                                            
24 One qualification to be made here is that the Mediterranean region has been 
excluded from this study for various reasons. First, this region is not central to the study 
of Europe’s rise, as the Mediterranean has been lagging behind in terms of 
development. Also, consistent long-term series covering both the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth century are hard to come by. Judging from some limited preliminary 
analysis done with some available series, this area might have been a distinct trading 
area, and the interpretation appears less clear than for the rest of Europe. Surely, the 
Mediterranean is a promising topic for further research. 
25 Many series are nowadays available both in original units and currencies as well as 
in standardised form, mostly expressed in grams of silver per litre or kilogram. The 
richest online sources of standardised grain price series are the Allen-Unger database 
at http://www2.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm and David Jacks’ data 
sets at http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/data.html. Consequently, all other, non-
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available for regions in the interior of Europe, however, so that many new 
price series have been collected from archives and old statistical journals 
to complement the more readily available series. For more detailed 
information about sources, coverage and conversions of all price series 
used, please consult the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 1: Market Towns Included in the New European Database 
 
 
It becomes clear from the database compiled for the study that this 
investigation follows the tradition of narrowing down the study of market 
integration to the study of commodity markets, and more specifically, to 
grain markets. Inference about the extent of the market at any point in 
time as well as the process of market integration or disintegration will be 
made from the comparative study of grain prices. This choice of focus can 
firstly be justified by the dominant position of grain in consumption and 
trade in the pre-twentieth-century world. This pre-eminence of grain is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
standardised grain price series used have also been converted into grams of silver per 
kilogram, using recent literature on the silver content and exchange rates of currencies. 
For more information, please consult the appendix. 
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manifest in the availability of data; it is for that period the good for which 
by far the most and best data is available. Any attempt to span an equal 
range of time and space for any good other than grain is virtually 
impossible to date. 
Apart from its dominant position, grain is for another reason 
arguably the most suitable good for assessing the course of commodity 
market integration. In terms of ‘transport suitability’ it could be called an 
intermediate good. It has on the one hand a high bulk-to-value ratio, 
meaning that transport costs and capacities are central to the extent of 
grain markets. Once grain markets become integrated, the markets for 
most other goods will also be integrated, as most of them are easier and 
cheaper to transport. When trying to assess the scope for a large scale 
reallocation of production factors to allow for specialisation through 
market integration, this condition must be met.  However, such a 
condition does not hold for goods with a very low bulk-to-value ratio, such 
as spices or fine cloth. Consequently, the markets for such goods have in 
some cases been integrated for centuries, even when the markets for 
most goods remained completely fragmented. Clearly, telling the story of 
the fine cloth market will not be representative for the more general 
picture and will not be useful when gauging the possibility of Smithian 
growth. On the other hand, though, some goods, eggs for example, will 
never be traded over longer distances, since they are inherently difficult, 
hence expensive, to transport.  Grain, as an intermediate case, makes for 
a good proxy for inferences about the overall process of expanding 
markets and the reach of an integrated market enabling large scale 
geographical reallocation and specialisation. 
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3. Using Factor Analysis to Study European Market Integration  
To remind the reader, the aim of the present contribution is to 
assess whether market integration helps to explain ‘why Europe’, and 
‘why north-western Europe in particular. In the present analysis, we 
therefore want to simultaneously look at these two research questions – 
but how can this be done? Clearly, and ‘all Europe’ analysis, the most 
popular way of dealing with this broad research question, will not provide 
the desired answers. So should we try out the second predominant mode 
of analysis – a country-wise investigation? Certainly, this is quite a 
meaningful observation unit, as several relevant factors like trade policy, 
currencies, legal systems or measurement units are often determined by 
national borders. But then national borders over the 250+ years under 
study are not constant but changing considerably. Also, when splitting up 
the European database into many different country sub-samples, we are 
once more faced with the problem of very small sample sizes. What is 
more, there are other potential categorisations that do not follow national 
borders, such as special trade routes or geographical features – which 
may well be more important dividing lines in early modern Europe than 
national borders. Thus, a novel approach is required. The solution 
proposed here about how to break up the newly compiled database is to 
let the data speak for itself. 
One way to attempt this is to use factor analysis, which is a popular 
analytical technique to detect structure in the relationship between 
variables, that is, to classify variables. Factor analysis is commonly used 
for data sets with many variables in order to uncover latent structures, 
with which the essential information of the data set can be expressed with 
a few variables – called factors. The basic principle of this technique is 
that is does not assume any dependent variable, but instead looks at the 
co-movement of individual variables. Simultaneous movement 
(correlation) of variables is taken as evidence of an underlying factor 
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shaping both variables. In the case of two variables, a new variable 
(factor) is then created, which is a linear combination of the two variables. 
When extending this procedure to multiple variables, the computations 
become more involved, but the basic principle of expressing two or more 
variables by a single factor remains the same.26  
In the present case, the variables are the time series of grain prices 
from cities all across Europe. Applying factor analysis, we are trying to 
detect underlying structures in European grain markets. In particular, we 
are trying to uncover groups of markets where prices behave similarly 
and to interpret what factors might account for such patterns, such as 
national borders, special trade routes, trade policies, or geography. To do 
this, the data set described above is used, but all price series have been 
differenced to avoid spurious correlation. This is central for factor 
analysis, where co-movement is at the centre of the analysis. If levels 
were used, some detected co-movement between variables would be 
spurious because of simultaneously rising price levels. Consequently, 
inferences would be mistaken and the newly constructed factors would be 
fundamentally flawed.  
Moving to the actual estimation, we face the choice of various 
variations of factor analysis. The most popular among these is Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), especially when the research purpose is 
trying to reduce the information in many measured variables into a 
smaller set of components. What PCA basically does is to seek linear 
combinations of variables such that the maximum variance is extracted 
from the variables. It then removes this variance and seeks a second 
linear combination which explains the maximum proportion of the 
remaining variance and so on. PCA therefore extracts uncorrelated 
(orthogonal) components in order of their importance for explaining the 
                                                            
26 For introductions to factor analysis, see Lawley and Maxwell, Factor analysis as a 
statistical method; Dunteman, Principal component analysis. 
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total variance in the data set. How many factors (components) we want to 
extract is an arbitrary decision. Note that as we extract consecutive 
factors, they account for less and less variability. This is demonstrated in 
Table 1, where 25 components have been extracted from a sample of 25 
wheat price series from 25 European cities. This sample is for early 
modern Europe and covers the years from about 1650 to about 1770, 
while most series only start in 1700.27 
 
Table 1: Total Variance Explained in Early modern European grain prices 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
  Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 10.63 42.52 42.52 
2 5.30 21.22 63.73 
3 3.48 13.93 77.66 
4 2.09 8.35 86.01 
5 1.45 5.78 91.79 
6 1.22 4.86 96.65 
7 0.84 3.35 100.00 
8 0.00 0.00 100.00 
… … … … 
25 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Sources: see appendix 
 
For each of the 25 components extracted by PCA, we see how 
much of the total variation in the data set they individually and collectively 
explain. The components are ordered according to the importance, with 
component 1 alone explaining 42% of the variation, and the first two 
already roughly two-thirds of the total variance. Note that the ‘total value’ 
                                                            
27 SPSS has been used throughout all estimations concerned with PCA. For a guide 
about how to use factor analysis in SPSS, see Norušis, SPSS 13.0 Statistical 
Procedures Companion. The reason that only 25 markets out of the total of 45 have 
been used for the PCA is that only series that cover big part of the pre-take off years 
(prior to1770) and that do not have holes have been used. 
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of the eigenvalue is just another way of expressing how much of the 
variance in all variables is accounted for by one component. The bigger 
the eigenvalue, the more one factor contributes to the explanation of the 
variance.  
Even though there are no clear rules of how many components to 
extract and interpret, there are some guidelines. One of them looks at the 
total variance explained and suggests that, depending on the 
researcher’s emphasis on parsimony, enough factors should be kept to 
account for about 50% to 90% of the variation. The Kaiser criterion 
proposes to retain all components with an eigenvalue in excess of 1, 
while other researchers prefer to plot the eigenvalues in so-called ‘scree 
plots’ (we will see one of them later on) and cut where the eigenvalues 
seem to level off. Regardless of the guidelines used, most often only the 
first two or three components are retained, whose dimensions of meaning 
are readily comprehensible. We will do the same here, keeping the two 
most important components only, which together account for nearly two-
thirds of the variation in the data.  
The next step in PCA is to look at how our individual variables 
relate to the newly constructed components in order to know the meaning 
of the components, that is, whether and how we can interpret them in a 
meaningful manner. In SPSS, which had been used for all PCA analysis, 
the relevant output in this respect is the component matrix. It shows 
‘factor loadings’, also called component loadings in PCA, which are the 
correlation coefficients between the variables (rows) and the components 
(columns). In the present case, the analysis is, as mentioned, restricted to 
the two most important components. The results are shown in Table 2, 
where we see how the individual price series from markets all across 
Europe relate to these two principal components extracted by PCA from 
the whole data set. 
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Table 2: Component Matrix for Early Modern Europe 
Market Town Component   Market Town Component 
  1 2     1 2
D_Lucerne 0.44 0.03  D_Amsterdam -0.18 0.72
D_Bern 0.75 -0.28  D_Gdansk -0.64 0.62
D_Munich 0.94 0.20  D_Boulogne 0.32 0.81
D_Vienna 0.38 -0.33  D_Exeter 0.37 0.66
D_Ueberlingen 0.99 -0.04  D_Windsor 0.45 0.68
D_Schafhausen 0.97 -0.11  D_Utrecht -0.45 0.53
D_Zurich 0.94 -0.17  D_Eton 0.44 0.73
D_Appenzell 0.93 -0.23  D_Winchester 0.44 0.70
D_Strasbourg 0.85 -0.16  D_Berlin 0.27 0.51
D_Augsburg 0.98 -0.19  D_Rennes -0.51 0.47
D_Frankfurt 0.87 -0.08  D_Toulouse 0.09 0.47
D_Grenoble 0.83 0.18  D_Madrid -0.38 -0.30
D_Hamburg 0.31 0.57    
 
Sources: see appendix 
 
 
When trying to make sense of what the newly constructed 
component might represent, we look at which variables are closely 
associated with the components. As with the number of components to 
retain, there is no clear criterion as to what actually represents a strong 
association between a variable and a component. That decision is 
arbitrary to some degree, though guidelines of ‘strong’ or ‘substantial’ 
connections often range from factor loadings in excess of 0.4 to factor 
loadings in excess to 0.6. In order to get a preliminary idea, the variables 
have been highlighted according to a middle estimate of 0.5. Of the 25 
variables, 10 variables have a factor loading of > 0.5 for component 1, 
that is, they are strongly correlated with component 1. At the same time, 
they are not strongly correlated with component 2. Roughly the other half 
of the variables, again 10 cities, show the mirror image, as they are 
strongly associated with component 2, but not with component 1. A few 
variables are not strongly associated with either of the two components, 
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like Vienna and Madrid, while Rennes and Toulouse only fall a bit short of 
the 0.5 threshold for component 2, and Lucerne only a bit short of the 
threshold for component 1. 
We now want to further examine what underlying structures these two 
principal components are picking up, that is, we want to try to label the 
two principal components that split our sample of 25 markets in nearly 
two halves.  Since our variables are grain price series of different cities, 
our observational units are geographic in nature, so that a good option to 
make sense of the factors loading is to visualise them on a map. 
Consequently, two maps have been drawn (Figure 2), the first showing 
the locations of cities with a factor loading exceeding 0.5 for component 
1, and the second showing all the cities with a factor loading of higher 
than 0.5 for component 2. 
 
Figure 2: Visualising the Principal Components of Early Modern Europe 
 
Factor loadings of >0.5 for component 1     Factor loadings of >0.5 for component 2 
 
 
The results are unequivocal in that they postulate two zones in the 
grain markets of early modern Europe. All variables (cities) which are 
strongly associated with component 1 are situated in the interior of 
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Europe, while all variables strongly correlated with component 2 are 
either on the coast or in the plains with ready access to the sea. With 
good reason we can label component 1 ‘landlocked Europe’ and 
component 2 ‘lowland Europe’. It therefore appears that physical 
geography is not only an important dimension to add, but that is actually 
the most characteristic feature of grain markets in early modern Europe. 
Most variation in prices across Europe is explained by the fact that price 
movements are similar within lowland Europe and within landlocked 
Europe. However, there is no connection between prices from the zones, 
that is, these are two very distinct and separated price regimes.28  
                                                            
28 This notion is actually not a new one, but has been proposed before. For the early 
modern period, William Abel found that grain prices rose in times of dearth much higher 
in the interior parts of Europe, stretching from Lemberg in the east all the way to 
Orléans in the west. In coastal areas, including their immediate hinterlands, running 
from Gdansk in the east to London, and even going into the Mediterranean, prices 
were generally lower and price increases in times of crises much lower. From this he 
concluded that up to the late eighteenth century, the European grain markets consisted 
of two basic zones, coastal Europe and inland Europe. His explanation for this was the 
much better trade opportunities in coastal Europe, where the availability of cheap water 
transportation greatly increased the scope for arbitrage between regions of high and 
low prices, or between regions of deficient and abundant harvests. Achilles and later 
Allen and Unger broadly corroborated Abel’s findings also for the general level of 
integration that included not only years of crises. The tentative results of all these 
studies are, however, hardly present in today’s literature on European market 
integration, and newer studies such as David Jack’s  ‘Commodity Market Integration in 
the Long-Run’ actually reject the idea of physical geography playing a central part in 
the history of European market integration. The absence of these early studies from 
today’s literature may partly be explained by their limitations. First, they are mostly 
restricted to a relatively small number of markets, or cover only limited time periods, so 
that generalisations for larger parts of Europe remained more speculative, while the 
trends in market segregation and integration over time could not be followed. Also, it 
remains unclear exactly where the dividing line between the two zones should be set. 
Second, they suffer from some clear methodological shortcomings. As most of these 
works are slightly dated, they often use fairly simple methods like comparing average 
price levels and one-year deviations to derive their results. When more systematic 
measures are used, like correlation analysis, they suffer from the fact that the problem 
of spurious correlation in the presence of non-stationary data had at the time of their 
publication not yet become an issue in econometrics. Consequently, when Abel as well 
as Allen and Unger found high correlations for the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, 
they were not aware that these co-movements of prices could to a good extent be 
spurious as they could simply be generated by the fact that these were periods of 
generally rising prices. Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im vorindustriellen 
Deutschland, pp. 38-39, 47. Achilles,  Getreidepreise und 
Getreidehandelsbeziehungen europäischer Räume im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, pp. 5-
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Five cities do, however, not quite fit the pattern. Two of them, 
Vienna and Madrid, show low factor loadings for both principal 
components. Both these markets are located in the interior, but they are 
rather distant from the bulk of the other landlocked markets. So distance 
is one additional factor we will have to take into account while we 
proceed. Lucerne is a third variant whose factor loading does not exceed 
the threshold for any component. However, it falls only slightly short of the 
0.5 threshold for component 1, and this is also where it should belong 
according to its landlocked location. Finally, also Toulouse and Rennes 
only slightly miss the threshold, this time for component 2, which would 
again be where they belong according to their geographic position. 
What explains this pattern that splits Europe into two? Three basic 
options seem possible. The first relates to trade activities and market 
structures: All landlocked cities show similar price movements because 
they form some sort of an integrated market, and the same applies for 
lowland Europe. However, grain is not traded across these zones, or is 
traded only at a relatively low level. This hypothesis basically contends 
two well-integrated European markets, which, however, remained 
separated from each other. A point to be mentioned here is that in the 
present sample the landlocked markets are geographically much closer 
together than the lowland markets (see Figure 2). Distance is certainly an 
issue, and we have mentioned before that Madrid and Vienna, which are 
the two interior markets farthest away from the bulk of landlocked 
markets, do not show a substantial connection to the landlocked 
component.  
A second possible explanation for two separate zones is that 
similar weather conditions across fairly large regions are causing prices to 
move similarly. While this definitely looks like a good option for the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
10, 33-34, 83-87, 114; Allen and Unger, ‘The Depth and Breadth of the Market for 
Polish Grain 1500-1800’. 
25 
 
landlocked parts where markets are fairly close to each other, it appears 
like a less powerful explanation for lowland Europe, where even very 
distant markets show co-movements. While in particular temperature 
patterns do show very large scale geographical patters, rainfall patterns in 
Europe normally vary more across distance than such an interpretation 
would suggest.  
A third possibility again relates to market integration, but this time 
to an absolute extent of integration in the two zones. It is well-known that 
food prices in integrated markets behave differently than prices in 
localised, un-integrated markets. Given the possibility of arbitrage in the 
former, volatility and seasonal differences are less in integrated markets, 
as imports or exports help to dampen local demand or supply shocks. As 
a consequence, the two zones may represent different stages of market 
integration, with one zone showing a price pattern more typical of an 
integrated market and the other zones price behaviour more 
characteristic in segmented markets.  
One first hint about how to explain this picture is given when 
repeating the exercise with nineteenth-century data. The data set is now 
slightly different, long series with no holes were not available for all 
markets for the nineteenth century. However, the 22 markets in the new 
sample, which cover the years 1800-1914, still extend over a similarly 
wide geographical range. Now, instead of a table listing all components 
and their explanatory power (as done in Table 1), for this later sample the 
same information is depicted in a scree plot, which shows the 
eigenvalues of all the 22 components extracted (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Eigenvalues of Components of Nineteenth-Century Sample 
 
 
 
Compared to the PCA for early modern Europe (pre-1770), this 
scree plot for the nineteenth century shows one striking difference: an 
absolutely dominant component. With an eigenvalue of nearly 13, the first 
component itself explains nearly 60% of the total variance. Already the 
second component explains relatively little. Certainly, if we wanted a 
parsimonious model and judged on the basis of the scree plot, we would 
only retain one component, as it really looks like the one important 
underlying pattern of the whole data set. Such a suggestion is 
corroborated when looking at the component matrix for the first two 
components. Nearly all variables – 20 out of 22 – are strongly associated 
(factor loading > 0.5) with component one. Meanwhile, only two variables 
show a strong connection to component 2, namely two Polish markets. 
So already component two seems to pick up only a side issue in the data 
set.  
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A map (Figure 4) visualising the cities with a factor loading 
exceeding 0.5 for the dominant component 1 very nicely wraps up the 
fundamental difference of nineteenth-century European grain markets 
when compared to the early modern picture (Figure 1). There is now one 
absolutely dominating component comprising the whole continent, and 
the clear separation of landlocked and lowland Europe that was so 
characteristic for early modern Europe is wholly absent. Surely, there is 
but one clear explanation for this: fuelled by a transport revolution and 
helped by more liberal policies, the whole of Europe now forms one single 
market. While weather patterns remain a possible explanation for the 
existence of the two Europes in the early modern era, they are surely not 
of any help for explaining the changes from the early period to the late 
period, as large spatial weather patterns do not normally change 
dramatically over such short time spans as a century.  
 
Figure 4: Visualising the Principal Component in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
 
Factor loadings of >0.5 for component 1 
 
 
Consequently, Principal Component Analysis corroborates earlier 
findings that the emergence of a pan-European market was a nineteenth-
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century phenomenon, as it was at this time when the two hitherto 
separated Europes became integrated together. What factor analysis 
cannot reveal, however, is the level and trends of market integration 
within both landlocked and lowland Europe – which is essential when 
answering ‘why Europe’ and ‘why north-western Europe’. 
 
 
4. Measuring Market Integration in the Two Europes 
By separately analysing the two European sub-samples, we want to 
determine whether geography not only split early modern European grain 
markets into two segregated zones, but whether it also resulted in distinct 
levels and trends of market integration within these zones. Hence 
traditional dimensions of market integrations such as national borders, 
trade policies or wars are ignored here, as we purely look at how 
geography and distance shaped the process of economic integration in 
Europe. 
We now turn to the analysis of this new data set, trying to gauge 
the level and process of market integration for both ‘Europes’. To do this, 
we now work with the whole dataset presented in Figure 1. However, all 
45 markets in this sample are now categorised either as a ‘landlocked’ or 
a ‘lowland’ market according to physical geography, which reproduces the 
spatial pattern that came out from the factor analysis performed above. 
As Figure 5 depicts, this produces a sub-sample of 20 landlocked 
markets that are located far from any coast and, as the dark colouring of 
the map indicates, often in rather hilly or even mountainous territory. The 
remaining 25 lowland markets are located either directly on the coast or 
are situated in plains characterised by low altitude and inclination and, in 
most cases, ready access to the sea via large navigable rivers. 
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Figure 5: The ‘Two Europes’: Landlocked and Lowland Europe 
 
‘Landlocked Europe’ sample of 20 markets  ‘Lowland Europe’ sample of 25 markets 
 
 
To infer the state of market integration and the processes of 
integration or disintegration over time from these price series, we resort to 
the most popular analytical tools used in that respect, namely correlation 
analysis, price convergence, and price volatility. The logic for applying 
these tools is basically the ‘law of one price’, which states that in perfectly 
integrated markets, where trade participants in two markets share the 
same information and transport costs become small, price differentials 
between these markets offer opportunities for arbitrage up to the point 
that prices are either the same in the two markets or reach a stable ratio 
where the difference in price equals transport costs. As a consequence, 
the two price series are expected in the long-run to show a linear 
relationship, while small local price shocks, which temporarily create 
disequilibria in this stable relationship, are quickly corrected for by 
arbitrage. Testing to what extent the newly compiled grain prices show 
these characteristics therefore serves as the basic means for gauging the 
extent of grain market integration at any point in time. Rather than picking 
one particular indicator, we will be using various indicators to do so, as 
30 
 
every analytical tool has its weaknesses, so that applying several will 
enhance the reliability of the analysis. 
 
Co-Movement of Prices 
We begin by scrutinising the first characteristic of prices in 
integrated markets, which is whether they show a stable linear long-term 
relationship. To do so, we use correlation analysis to measure the 
strength or degree of linear association between price series in different 
markets. Correlation coefficients indicate the quality of the binary 
relationship, because the higher the coefficient, the stronger the 
association between the variables. Hence higher coefficients suggest a 
more integrated market, and they are expected to decrease with the 
distance between two markets as transport costs rise. To avoid any 
problems arising from spurious correlation, all price series have been 
differenced for the analysis. 
The results of the correlation analysis for the two Europes are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4, and they have been grouped and 
aggregated into time periods and according to the distance between the 
two markets. Combining the price series of the markets in each sub-
sample with each other, a total of 866 binary relations (correlations) were 
examined in total, of which 349 for landlocked Europe (Table 3) and 517 
for lowland Europe (Table 4). The exact numbers of correlations 
examined for each time period in lowland and landlocked Europe are 
given in brackets.  
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Table 3: Correlations in landlocked Europe 
 1700-1750 1750-1790 1790-1820 1825-1860 1870-1914
  [n = 58] [n = 100] [n = 64] [n = 90] [n = 37]
35-70 km 0.76 (0.08) 0.80 (0.07) 0.79 (0.16) 
70-150 km 0.54 (0.20) 0.62 (0.15) 0.71 (0.19) 0.83 (0.18) 
150-300 km 0.37 (0.18) 0.48 (0.15) 0.67 (0.13) 0.71 (0.19) 0.76 (0.10)
300-600 km 0.30 (0.20) 0.42 (0.17) 0.50 (0.32) 0.68 (0.24) 0.79 (0.11)
600-1000 km 0.22 (0.19) 0.22 (0.24) 0.34 (0.28) 0.27 (0.15) 0.74 (0.15)
1000-1500 km 0.15 (0.10) 0.06 (0.28) 0.38 (0.18) 0.34 (0.12) 0.72 (0.15)
>1500 km -0.04 (0.10) -0.19 (0.14) 0.34 (0.09) 0.79 (0.08)
 
n: total number of market pairs examined; the average correlation coefficient reported 
for the different distance ranges and time periods are simple arithmetic averages of the 
relevant binary correlation coefficients; the standard deviations of the correlation 
coefficients are given in parenthesis. Distance ranges with n≤3 are not reported. To 
reiterate: for all correlations, differenced series have been used. 
 
Table 4: Correlations in lowland Europe 
 1700-1750 1750-1790 1790-1820 1825-1860 1870-1914
  [n = 91] [n = 186] [n = 145] [n = 52] [n = 43]
35-70 km  
70-150 km 0.88 (0.08) 0.75 (0.16) 0.77 (0.08)
150-300 km 0.73 (0.10) 0.71 (0.12) 0.68 (0.18) 0.81 (0.15) 0.80 (0.16)
300-600 km 0.34 (0.24) 0.37 (0.28) 0.58 (0.17) 0.84 (0.08) 0.79 (0.12)
600-1000 km 0.36 (0.28) 0.34 (0.27) 0.45 (0.15) 0.83 (0.06) 0.82 (0.16)
1000-1500 km 0.27 (0.20) 0.16 (0.25) 0.32 (0.19) 0.70 (0.19) 0.70 (0.13)
>1500 km 0.24 (0.25) 0.11 (0.20) 0.21 (0.17) 0.46 (0.25) 0.69 (0.09)
 
n: total number of market pairs examined; the average correlation coefficient reported 
for the different distance ranges and time periods are simple arithmetic averages of the 
relevant binary correlation coefficients; the standard deviations of the correlation 
coefficients are given in parenthesis. Distance ranges with n≤3 are not reported. To 
reiterate: for all correlations, differenced series have been used. 
 
 
Let us first look briefly at the common features of both regions. 
First, distance is confirmed as the basic determinant for the extent of 
integration in the pre-railway period: nearly uniformly in all time periods, 
bar the late nineteenth century, correlations fall with increasing distance. 
Also, correlation coefficients increase over time, suggesting a gradual 
process of market integration over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries. Regional markets, on the one hand, were already closely 
integrated by the early eighteenth century in both of the two regions. 
Long-distance markets, on the other hand, only became closely linked in 
the course of the nineteenth century, thereby creating an overarching 
European market by the late nineteenth century. In the period from 1700 
to 1914, both regions witnessed the most fundamental expansion of 
market areas in history, starting from a regional level, then moving to an 
interregional, and finally to a Europe-wide (and global) level. This already 
highlights one central finding, namely that there was no ‘Big Bang” in 
terms of integration, neither in the very late eighteenth nor in the early 
nineteenth century.  
So much for the common features of the two Europes; now we 
want to move on to describing their differences, which we set out to 
explore in this section – and which are indeed quite distinct, judging from 
correlation analysis. 
First, while local and regional markets were already well integrated 
in both areas in the first half of the eighteenth century, lowland Europe’s 
markets clearly extended much further, i.e. the position of the lowland line 
in Figure 6 is positioned markedly and consistently over the landlocked 
line. In lowland Europe, markets up to a distance range of 300 km appear 
very closely connected, with average correlation coefficient exceeding 
0.7. In landlocked Europe, only markets up to a distance of 70 km are that 
closely linked, while for markets further apart than 150 km, correlation 
coefficients drop below 0.5.  
A second feature that sets the two Europes apart is rather different 
trends in the eighteenth century. While lowland Europe starts at a 
considerably higher level of integration at the beginning of the century, 
progress over the eighteenth century is only modest. In the interior, 
however, the eighteenth century is a period of expanding markets: in 
Table 3, the coefficients for all distance ranges increase gradually from 
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the first time period (1700-1750) to the third period (1790-1820). By the 
turn of the nineteenth century, the reach of well integrated market areas 
extends at least up to 300km. The degrees of integration of interregional 
markets (150-300km) did by then nearly reach the level in lowland 
Europe. While coefficients for all distance ranges are still higher in 
lowland Europe, the eighteenth century clearly saw a good deal of 
convergence. This catch-up process continues in the nineteenth century, 
so that by the end of the century, the differences in market integration 
between lowland and landlocked Europe have all but disappeared, as 
Figure 6 nicely illustrates.  
A third dividing line is the greater heterogeneity in lowland Europe 
during the eighteenth century. This can be seen by the much higher 
standard deviations for longer distances in the lowland sample. This 
means, on the one hand, that distance does not explain everything, but 
that other determinants were important for the degree of connection 
between two markets, especially for lowland Europe. What these 
aggregated coefficients therefore hide is that for some city pairs, 
coefficients were considerably higher than the averages. Above average 
correlations for longer distances (>300 km) were in particular found for 
special trade routes, namely between cities in Eastern Prussia and 
Poland and the Netherlands.  
A final clear dividing line between the two Europes can be drawn 
for the integration of long-distance markets (over 1000 km). While in both 
parts long-distance markets remain fragmented throughout the eighteenth 
century, their integration in lowland Europe is to a good degree already 
accomplished by the middle of the century (1825-1860). That is not true 
at all for landlocked Europe, where the integration of long-distance 
markets was clearly only achieved in the second half of the century. It is 
therefore only lowland Europe that fits the consensus in the literature that 
the decisive period for market integration in Europe was the second 
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quarter of the nineteenth century. Landlocked Europe does not fit this 
stylised consensus as there, long-distance markets really only became 
integrated in the late nineteenth century. However, by the late nineteenth 
century, distance really is ‘dead” all over Europe, a fact that is nicely 
illustrated by the flat correlation lines for that period shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Two Europes, Catch-up and the Death of Distance 
 
Sources: See appendix 
 
Price Convergence 
Based on the law of one price, commodity price convergence is 
considered a reliable indicator for expanding markets. Therefore price 
dispersion, as measured by the coefficient of variation, has been 
calculated for both the entire landlocked and lowland Europe samples 
(‘entire samples’). The results are shown in Figure 7, for which centred 
11-year moving averages have been used.  
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The central conclusion from this exercise is that it corroborates 
earlier studies which found that price convergence across Europe, or 
indeed across continents, really only happened some time after the 
Napoleonic Wars had ended.29 Although there was a sustained fall in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, in particular in Europe’s interior, 
the big picture before the 1820s for long distance trade is one of 
stagnation. On the other hand, price convergence comes to a halt after 
around 1870, when prices even slightly diverge. Also this finding is very 
much in line with conventional wisdom, as the late nineteenth century 
saw, in some parts of Europe, the stepping up of trade barriers in reaction 
to the so-called ‘grain invasion’ from abroad.30 Another conclusion arising 
from the entire sub-sample results depicted in Figure 7 is that price 
dispersion in lowland Europe was considerably lower at all times, which 
again underlines the systematic differences between the two Europes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did globalisation begin?’; Findlay and O’Rourke, 
‘Commodity Market Integration, 1500-2000’. 
30 O’Rourke, ‘The European Grain Invasion’. 
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Figure 7: Price Dispersion and Price Convergence, 1650-1900 
 
Sources: See appendix 
 
 
However, in some respects this comparison is flawed, as the two 
sub-samples are not directly comparable. In particular, the average 
distance between two markets, which is slightly changing over time, 
stands at between 700 and 900 km for landlocked Europe and at between 
900 and1200 km for lowland Europe. Consequently, average distances at 
all times are about 200-300 km larger in lowland Europe compared to 
landlocked Europe (see also Figure 5 for a graphic illustration). Since 
distance has over and over been confirmed as central for transport costs 
and, hence, integration, one would want to adjust for differences in 
distance between the samples. However, to actually do so would 
necessitate a lot of very tentative assumptions, since we would have to 
assume some average transport costs, as well as their changes over 
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time. What is clear, however, irrespective of the assumptions, is that such 
a correction to hold distances constant would substantially increase the 
price dispersion in landlocked Europe compared to lowland Europe. In 
other words, the sub-sample lines in Figure 7 understate the true extent 
of the differences between the two Europes in terms of price dispersion. 
As outlined, these findings for the ‘entire samples’ are capturing the 
process of price convergence between very distant markets. Therefore, 
what we have been describing so far is the integration of long-distance 
markets, so that these lines try to measure the same as the correlation 
coefficients for very large distances. The findings yielded by both 
techniques, correlation analysis and price convergence, are broadly 
matching, in that both confirm earlier studies that long distances markets 
only became integrated in the period after, say, 1820. The ‘Big Bang’ 
conclusion does seem to hold for long-distance trade. 
However, – and this has been stated before – this macro view, 
which is shaping the conventional wisdom about market integration these 
days, completely misses the process of regional and interregional 
integration.31 Correlation analysis suggested that the actual integration 
process started earlier, following the logic of gradual market expansion, 
starting from a local level at some point in the early modern era and finally 
reaching long-distance trade in the nineteenth century. Such an 
interpretation is confirmed for price convergence on a regional level, as 
depicted by the dotted lines in Figure 7, which show the price 
convergence process, in both landlocked and lowland Europe, between 
markets that are on average approximately 100 km apart from each other. 
Clearly, the eighteenth century now appears as a very dynamic period, by 
the end of which prices across these cities have nearly converged. Once 
                                                            
31 The macro studies shaping the present scholarly opinion include Jacks, ‘Intra- and 
International Commodity Market Integration in the Atlantic Economy, 1800-1913’; 
O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did globalisation begin’; Federico and Persson, 
‘Market integration and convergence in the world wheat market, 1800-2000’. 
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more, we find that the process of economic integration was much more 
gradual than conventional wisdom would have it. At the same time, Figure 
7 also confirms two other earlier findings. First, price dispersion was 
considerably greater in landlocked Europe, pointing to a lower level of 
integration compared to the landlocked part. Second, distance is again 
confirmed as a central variable when looking at market integration, as 
price dispersion was a great deal higher over long distances compared to 
the regional level throughout the entire examination period. 
 
Price Volatility 
Let us finally look at an analytical method which is not directly 
dependent on distance. A decrease in the single-market price volatility is 
generally viewed as a concomitant of an expanding market. Price volatility 
is supposedly higher in fragmented markets compared with integrated 
markets, as in the latter case large variations in the local harvest 
(predominantly determined by local weather conditions) translate into only 
limited price shocks as they are dampened by the possibility of 
geographical arbitrage between surplus and deficient regions.32 We 
measure price volatility in a market by the coefficient of variation, which is 
defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean, and the results for 
both European regions are shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
32 It needs to be mentioned that other factors than arbitrage can reduce price volatility; 
one factor could have been the reduction in the cost of storage. A decline in interest 
rates would encourage more people to store. Thus both geographical and inter-
temporal arbitrage mattered. 
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Figure 8: Average Price Volatility in European Markets, 1650-1900 
 
Sources: See appendix 
 
 
In the seventeenth century, volatility levels were much higher in the 
interior than along the coasts.33 However, again we find some 
convergence in the eighteenth century, when volatility levels in normal 
years look very similar in both regions. However, in times of the 
widespread harvest failures (in particular in 1770 and 1816) prices 
continued to increase much more in landlocked areas. Arguably lowland 
Europe’s access to far more distant markets with less serious shortfalls 
meant that larger amounts of grain could be imported to dampen the 
supply-induced price shocks.  
 
                                                            
33 This confirms Abel, who found that price rises in coastal towns were generally lower 
than price rises in inland towns. Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im 
vorindustriellen Deutschland, pp. 38-39. 
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Another point about the bigger picture can be made when looking 
at the co-movement of volatilities. While up to the late eighteenth century, 
volatility levels behaved independently, they increasingly started moving 
similarly in both regions. This clearly suggests that the two Europes 
formed separate market areas in the eighteenth century. Thereafter, 
markets in both Europes became exposed to the same market forces, 
which is yet another proof of Europe-wide market integration by the 
nineteenth century, this time from a slightly different angle. 
 
 
5. Explaining the Story of the Two Europes 
The current findings suggest that physical geography was a crucial 
factor in determining the reach of the market in early modern Europe, and 
thereby support the strand of research that claim an important role for 
geographical variables for economic development.34 Geography not only 
shaped the levels of integration, but also the trends. Is there a good 
narrative to support these conclusions and what is the link between 
geography and the reach of the market? That missing link is the 
availability of transportation.  
Any production and exchange of goods through a market depends 
on the ability to transport goods from the producer to the market, and 
finally to the consumer. At any given time, the extent of the market and 
the degree of integration and specialisation therefore hinges on the 
performance of its transport environment – the capacity, cost, speed, and 
                                                            
34 Well-known writings that stress the importance of geography (such as disease 
environment, natural resources, soil quality, abundant and well-spread rainfall, the 
absence of climatic extremes, and the presence of navigable rivers and access to the 
sea) are for example Sachs, ‘Tropical Underdevelopment’ and The End of Poverty, in 
particular chapters 3-4; Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel; Landes, The Wealth and 
Poverty of Nations, ch. 1-2. Geography’s importance as a central growth variable is, of 
course, a hotly debated topic and contested by authors who see the influence of 
geography as rather minor compared with factors such as institutions; see for instance 
Rodrik et al., ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and 
Integration in Economic Development’. 
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reach of transportation, as well as its stability, reliability, and regularity. 
Everything else equal, superior transport facilities increase the reach of 
the market, and therefore foster competition, increasing division of labour 
and regional specialisation, which all leads to both an intensifying and 
geographically more far-reaching trade in goods and services.35 
Here, we have to restrict the description of the comparative picture 
of the transport environments in both regions to the bare minimum, 
highlighting the most crucial distinctive features. The two basic transport-
related factors that can jointly explain the different levels of market 
integration in landlocked and lowland Europe are water transportation and 
inclination. 
Let us start with water transportation. In the pre-railway era, 
transport on water was by far the cheapest and fastest. On the one hand, 
wind was the one main source of cheap non-human and non-animal 
energy in the pre-industrial transport environment, and was exploited by 
sailing ships. Therefore, sailing ships were the main means of long-
distance transport. The other source was gravity that supported free 
energy for downstream river transport. But even upstream river transport 
was cheaper than overland transport, as the level of energy efficiency is 
better on water than overland. It is thus no wonder that estimated 
transport costs of maritime transport in early modern Europe range from 
1.5 to 10 per cent of the costs of transporting the same goods overland, 
while for inland shipping the estimates range from 7 to 50 per cent of the 
cost.36  
 
                                                            
35 Szostak’s The Role of Transportation in the Industrial Revolution is any extensive 
treatment of the connection between transportation and historical economic 
development. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Ville, Transport and the 
Development of the European Economy, especially at pp. 1-12. Sieferle and 
Breuninger’s Transportgeschichte im internationalen Vergleich, pp. 5-41 provide some 
in-depth discussion of the link between transport and development. 
36 Weber, Untiefen, Flut und Flauten, pp. 97-105; Sieferle and Breuninger’s 
Transportgeschichte im internationalen Vergleich Sieferle, pp. 12-17. 
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The European peninsula was naturally very suitable for coastal and 
maritime trade, as it offered plenty of access to the sea plenty. Compared 
with other coastal areas in the world, Europe’s lands with access to the 
sea had even a special advantage for maritime shipping in that its coasts 
are jagged and in that it has several islands, so that it is endowed with an 
even longer coastline relative to its size than, say, India. In addition to 
their ready access to the sea, the plains of Europe – lowland Europe 
called here – from Prussia in the east to Bordeaux in the west, and in 
England, not only met the geographical requirements for inland 
navigation, but increasingly also the technological and financial ones, 
which were in many cases the real limiting factors for continuous and 
reliable – i.e. economically efficient – inland shipping. While some works 
to make rivers navigable are documented for the late Middle Ages, it was 
– as with the road network – the late seventeenth century, and in 
particular the eighteenth century that witnessed a clear break with the 
past and continuing improvements of inland waterways. All over Europe, 
from German lands, to the Low Countries, England, and France, dams 
and sluices were being built, river beds regulated, while newly-
constructed towpaths also rendered upstream transport possible. To 
complement the natural waterways, in order to connect naturally 
navigable rivers or to increase density of the waterways more generally, 
artificial canals started to emerge simultaneously in many places.37 
Elsewhere – in landlocked Europe in particular – the extent of 
inland waterways remained limited. It often had fewer navigable rivers, 
more inclination to overcome, while seasonally varying water levels, ice, 
                                                            
37 However, pre-industrial technology in Europe was not able fully to tame many big 
naturally navigable rivers, while many grand projects of extensive river improvements 
and new canals were shipwrecked by the failure to raise the huge sums needed to 
carry them out. Thus the extent of artificial canals still remained limited outside England 
and the Low Countries, which were also the only countries to possess really dense 
networks of waterways by the late eighteenth century. By 1750, England had 2250 km 
of navigable inland waterways usable for the transport sector, which further increased 
to 6580 km by 1830; Duckham, Canals and River Navigation, pp. 109ff. 
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and frequent flooding remained serious obstacles until the nineteenth 
century, when technological solutions to these problems resulted in 
greatly increased the networks of continuous inland waterways that were 
at the same time much less dependent on seasons and the weather more 
generally.38  
The second crucial edge lowland Europe had in terms of 
geographical endowment was its low level of inclination compared to the 
often hilly or mountainous territories of the interior. Even though already 
mentioned in connection with inland navigation, this factor weighs much 
more heavily when it comes to overland transport.  The energy efficiency 
of animals and humans as bio-converters is rather low, estimated at 10-
20 per cent, making the carrying of heavy goods a rather energy-
consuming operation. Add the wasteful vertical dislocation of the load 
carried by draught animals and topographical obstacles posed by hills 
and mountains both for building roads and transporting goods and it 
becomes evident why flat territory makes the construction of a transport 
infrastructure as well as the transport itself so much easier and cheaper.39 
To sum up, physical geographical endowed lowland Europe with 
both cheaper and much more widespread water transport as well as 
cheaper overland transport. An argument can therefore be made that 
physical geography divided early modern Europe generally into two 
transport regimes, thereby shaping the extent of economic integration in 
early modern Europe. It only seems logical that markets areas in lowland 
Europe should have been much greater, while the exchange of goods as 
                                                            
38 For a short overview of inland navigation in pre-industrial Europe, see Weber, 
Untiefen, Flut und Flauten, pp. 55-75. Another very readable overview of European 
inland waterways is provided in Ville, Transport and the Development of the European 
Economy, pp. 30-47. Crompton, ‘The tortoise and the economy’ provides a discussion 
of the importance of inland waterways on European industrialisation. 
39 See for instance Sieferle and Breuninger’s Transportgeschichte im internationalen 
Vergleich, pp. 10-17.  
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well as specialisation is expected to have been much more intense as a 
consequence. 
When trying to explain the different trends in market integration in 
landlocked and lowland Europe observed in the previous sections, the 
history of transportation systems is again crucial. To start with, the 
general gradual expansion of market areas over the whole period, and 
gaining pace in the late eighteenth century, clearly fits the gradual 
improvement of the transport infrastructure. Also, the catch-up of 
landlocked Europe over the eighteenth century may illustrate that the 
intensification of road development in this period was much more crucial 
for the interior of Europe, simply because there no cheap alternative to 
road transport in the form of water transport was available. At least for the 
cities right on the coasts and alongside navigable rivers, road 
development had most probably far more modest effects on the level of 
market integration.40 Similarly, the different transport environments can 
also give a hint as to why the timing of the integration of long-distance 
markets has varied for the two Europes. Steamships, which were 
predominantly used in lowland parts of Europe, came into widespread 
use already in the first half of the nineteenth century, and therefore 
supported an early expansion of markets. Extensive railway networks, on 
the other hand, were only completed in the second half of the century 
(with a few exceptions in lowland Europe). Consequently, landlocked 
Europe’s integration into a pan-European grain market lagged behind, 
and long-distance markets only became integrated in the late nineteenth 
century.41 
 
                                                            
40 A very good overview of overland transport in pre-railway Europe is also provided by 
Popplow, ‘Europa auf Achse’, pp. 87-156. 
41 A concise treatment of various aspects of the European railway network, including its 
extent and its financing as well as its debated impact on economic development and 
social savings is provided in Ville, Transport and the Development of the European 
Economy, pp. 114-7. 
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Finally, while the transport revolution in the nineteenth century 
made transport cheaper, faster, more regular, and more reliable all over 
Europe, one has to appreciate that this was particularly so for the interior 
territories, which had faced much more adverse conditions for 
transportation. Steam transport not only epitomised the process of 
economic development, it simultaneously ended an age-long transport 
advantage of lowland over landlocked Europe. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The results of the factor analysis are unequivocal in that propose a 
notion of two zones in the grain markets of early modern Europe. It 
appears that physical geography is not only an important dimension to 
add to the history of economic integration in Europe, but that it is actually 
the most characteristic feature of grain markets in early modern Europe. 
Most variation in prices across Europe is explained by the fact that price 
movements are similar within lowland Europe and within landlocked 
Europe. However, there is no connection between prices from these 
zones, that is, there are two very distinct and separated price regimes. 
As, by the nineteenth century, this pattern of a divided Europe is wholly 
absent, the standard view stating that the emergence of a pan-European 
market for bulky goods was a nineteenth- century phenomenon is 
corroborated. 42 
When moving to an in-depth analysis of both Europes to determine 
their respective paths of economic integration, the resulting picture is one 
of some common features and plenty of distinctive differences. 
 
                                                            
42 Jacks, ‘Intra- and International Commodity Market Integration in the Atlantic 
Economy, 1800-1913’; O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did globalisation begin?’ 
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As for the common features present in both landlocked and lowland 
Europe, distance is confirmed as the central determinant shaping the 
degree of integration. Also, both regions show a gradual expansion of 
markets over the whole time period from 1700 to 1914, with the effects 
that the cumulative expansion witnessed over this time period amounts to 
the most fundamental expansion of the market in history. In both 
Europes, the scope of integrated markets moved from a regional to a 
pan-European, even global, level over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
This central finding on common levels and trends thus reject many 
popular positions in the literature. First, it rejects the ‘Big Bang’ 
hypothesis, arguably the dominating position in the market integration 
literature that contends a period of stagnation in the eighteenth century 
(or the entire early modern period), followed by a sudden expansion of 
the market at the turn of, or very early in, the nineteenth century.43 Here 
we find that there was no ‘Big Bang” in terms of integration, neither in the 
very late eighteenth nor in the early nineteenth century. However, the 
present results of a much more gradual expansion of markets also 
contradict claims that the eighteenth century saw ‘the beginning of an all-
European grain market’, which sound overly optimistic.44 
However, these new results find support in numerous studies 
focussing on regional or interregional markets structures. These works 
find that in eighteenth-century Europe, regional markets were well 
integrated and in many cases expanding.45 All of this confirms the 
                                                            
43 E.g. Clark, ‘Markets and Economic Growth. The Grain Market of Medieval England’; 
O’Rourke and Williamson, ‘When did globalisation begin?’ 
44 Persson, Grain Markets in Europe, 1500-1900, p. 100. Braudel and Spooner’s 
detected price convergence between very distant markets also appear rather on the 
optimistic side. Braudel and Spooner, ‘Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750’, Figure 19. 
45 Grain was brought from the countryside to nearby towns. Many towns furthermore 
served depot functions, from where grain was, according to incentives, transported to 
and sold in other cities. See, for instance, Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am Bodensee; 
Giger-Eschke, Kornmarktpolitik Zürichs im 18. Jahrhundert; Brandenberger, Ausbruch 
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suspicion mentioned at the outset: The current consensus is indeed 
grossly misleading, as ‘European integration’ is not equal to ‘integration in 
Europe’. 
Despite the common trajectories, the other major findings of this 
paper paint a picture of fundamental differences between landlocked and 
lowland Europe. In the early modern period, lowland Europe’s markets 
clearly extended to much bigger geographical areas: co-movement was 
stronger and shows close integration over longer distances than in 
landlocked Europe. Accordingly, price dispersion is much greater in the 
interior, as are volatility levels. The eighteenth century then brought about 
the beginning of the end of lowland Europe’s advantage, as market areas 
expanded substantially in the landlocked part, but only modestly in the 
lowland parts. On a regional and interregional scale, both increasing 
correlation coefficients and converging prices supported this picture of 
convergence. The general level of integration was still higher in lowland 
Europe by the turn of the nineteenth century, but the difference had been 
much reduced. The second quarter of the nineteenth century saw, 
however, a renewed divergence between the two regions, as in lowland 
parts integration in this period clearly broke out of the pre-modern ties, so 
that even very distant market were now connected, while prices between 
them converged. Landlocked Europe had to await the construction of a 
dense railway network in the second half of the century to experience the 
same acceleration of integration, which eventually resulted in the 
formation of a pan-European market. 
Overall, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a 
convergence in terms of market integration between the two Europes. 
Starting from a very different state in the late seventeenth or early 
eighteenth century, the level of integration was nearly identical by the turn 
                                                                                                                                                                              
der ‚Malthusianischen Falle’. Versorgungslage und Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Staate 
Bern 1755-1797; O’Grada and Chevet, ‘Famine and Market in Ancien Régime France’. 
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of the twentieth century. Clearly, steam transportation and the creation of 
extensive road networks disposed of lowland Europe’s advantage 
provided by a physical geography that had endowed it with easier and 
cheaper transportation. Thus this study adds physical geography to the 
list of determinants for market integration, and suggests that geography 
shaped the patterns and extent of economic integration probably more 
than any other factor.46  
By now, the question about what explains the presence of two 
distinct price patterns in early modern Europe has also become much 
clearer. Three basic options seemed possible, the first being common 
weather patterns within landlocked and lowland Europe. Even though the 
climate argument cannot be completely rejected, it seems very 
implausible that it was a major cause for the distinct price patterns, as by 
the nineteenth century the price pattern across the whole of Europe are 
nearly uniform. A second hypothesis assumed that there were two 
Europes simply because they both formed some sort of trading areas, 
which were integrated within but did not trade across much. Such an 
explanation does have some merit, as especially popular trading routes 
such as the Baltic trade highlight. However, the main cause for trading 
within rather than across was not being part of one particular trading area, 
but rather distance. As highlighted by the analyses, distance was crucial 
in early modern Europe, so that landlocked cities traded with landlocked 
cities just because they were closer than lowland cities. The third 
explanation for the two market zones also relates to market integration, 
but this time to an absolute extent of integration in the two zones. And this 
                                                            
46 This goes against a very recent study by David Jacks, in which physical geography 
was found not to have played an important role in the process of European integration, 
and, hence, development. The reason why Jacks does not find any important role for 
geography is most likely because his data only start at various points in the nineteenth 
century. As the present contribution makes clear, the importance of geography had by 
then already been much reduced. Jacks, ‘Commodity Market Integration in the Long-
Run’. 
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clearly emerges as the most powerful explanation, given our findings. As 
said before, food prices in integrated markets behave differently than 
prices in less integrated ones. Since the level of integration was 
considerably higher in the lowland part, its price pattern was more typical 
of an integrated market than the predominant pattern in the markets of 
the interior. 
Finally, we want to return briefly to the bigger debate, which 
motivated this piece of research. Does the concept of Smithian or trade-
led growth help to explain why it was Europe that led the economic 
development in the world and industrialised first? Does it give us a clue 
about why, within Europe, it was its North-western part that spearheaded 
the ‘rise of Europe”?  
Let us start with the first question: ‘why Europe’? We mentioned 
that so far, the assessments about the role of market integration for 
Europe’s industrialisation range from negligible to central, and that the 
plausibility of whether trade-led growth played a crucial role for the 
Industrial Revolution in Europe hinges on whether Europe experienced a 
process of market integration prior to, or at least accompanying, its 
economic ‘take off’ in the late eighteenth century. Well, this study 
concludes that market integration pre-dated the take-off in the late 
eighteenth or early nineteenth century, so it was neither a concomitant 
nor an effect of the Industrial Revolution.47 It is thus a plausible 
determinant for the rise of Europe. This neither means that we should 
view market integration as a sufficient condition for the Industrial 
Revolution nor that these findings ought to supplant existing explanations 
of the Industrial Revolution. It simply puts market expansion on the table 
as one very plausible factor among other factors to explain the rise of 
Europe. 
                                                            
47 The comparison of China and Europe concludes for instance that market integration 
was a concomitant of the take-off, not a cause of it. Shuie and Keller, ‘Markets in China 
and Europe’. 
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Now to the second question: ‘why, within Europe, it was its North-
western part that spearheaded the rise of Europe’? The conclusion from 
this investigation is: ‘Because of physical geography, which had endowed 
north-western Europe – more broadly called lowland Europe here – with 
easier and cheaper transportation.’ 
Hopefully, we have by now established that link between 
geography and economic integration. But how would the story about the 
subsequent link from bigger markets to economic growth look like? The 
speculative logic for such an argument could run as follows: Since 
lowland Europe had larger markets, it enjoyed more widespread and 
faster exchanges of goods and knowledge. This increased regional 
specialisation, and led to faster diffusion of knowledge and more spill-over 
effects, and hence resulted in a more productive economy, whose 
economic development must have outstripped that in landlocked Europe. 
Moreover, in accordance with newer research, the increased importance 
of trade and of profits thereof strengthened commercial interests and 
increased their political power while it had a constraining effect on the 
power of monarchs. This shift of power away from the monarchy induced 
significant institutional reforms in favour of institutions that were 
conducive to growth, as they guaranteed private property and personal 
freedom, the rule of law and the prevention of excessive spending by the 
crown. With their newly gained property rights, these merchants in 
lowland Europe invested more, traded more and spurred on economic 
growth. 
The informed reader will be aware that the argument just outlined 
combined a Smithian-type and an institutional argument along the lines of 
North and Thomas and, more recently, Daron Acemoglu and his co-
authors.48 Compared with these popular accounts, the argument is 
                                                            
48 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in 
particular book 1; North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic 
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redirected here. In Acemoglu’s account, the decisive geographic 
determinant for early economic development is access to the Atlantic, 
while the trade that arguably induced institutional change was the 
overseas trade with the colonies. Here, a similar argument can be made, 
in which the geographical determinant is not access to the Atlantic, but 
being part of lowland Europe more generally. And instead of colonial 
trade, it is the higher levels in intra-European trade that triggered 
institutional change and economic change. Given that maritime and 
coastal trade was in all probability only a relatively small share of both 
total world trade and total European trade, this seems quite reasonable. 
Thus, the big trade story ought not to be the centred on the Atlantic trade, 
but should instead focus on the intra-European trade on local, regional 
and interregional levels. 
While the underlying logic in the two arguments is different, the 
predictions in both narratives would be very similar, namely that north-
western Europe should, ultimately for geographical reasons leading to 
more trade, enjoy higher economic growth than other regions. While 
England and the Netherlands can quickly be named to supply empirical 
evidence for both narratives, a serious empirical study is more 
complicated in the present narrative. While estimates for production and 
growth are already crude at national levels, there are no estimates 
available for the categorisation proposed here. To compare production 
and growth rates in landlocked and lowland Europe would require entirely 
new research. However, as the present investigation suggests, it might be 
a promising area for new research. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
History; Acemoglu et al., ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and 
Economic Growth’. 
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Appendix:  
Sources Of Grain Prices 
The list below shows all the sources used for the analysis, grouped 
into the two sub-samples ‘lowland’ and ‘landlocked’ Europe. The cities, 
which are included in the sample, are shown in alphabetically order. This 
database of European grain prices includes price series from 45 markets 
across Europe. The prices series represent annual average prices for 
wheat, if not mentioned otherwise. The conversions used to standardise 
the original prices are shown for the individual series. If not noted 
otherwise, conversions used to turn capacity into weight measures are 
76kg/hl for wheat and 72kg/hl for spelt. See Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am 
Bodensee, p. 486. For the often used conversion of Pound Sterling into 
grams of silver, the following sources were used: For 1600-1816: 
Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: A History of English Money, pp. 346, 
348-9. For 1817-1829: International Monetary Conference, United States 
Senate Executive Document No. 58, pp. 611-613. The values for 1830-
1832 are interpolated. For 1833-1900: United States, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, p. 65. The conversions are available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/london.xls.  
 
 
Lowland Europe 
Amsterdam, 1700-1910 
Source: Posthumus, Inquiry into the History, vol. 1. Prices in grams of 
silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
This series has some whole, which were filled with regression analysis 
using rye prices from Groningen from W. Tijms, ‘Graanprizen’, available 
at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~nahi 
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Antwerp, 1772-1913 
Sources: Van der Wee, H., The Growth of the Antwerp Market; Verlinden, 
C. and J. Craeybeckx, Documents pour l'histoire des prix. Original prices 
in groats/viertel and in francs/hl or per 100kg. Calendar years. Prices in 
grams of silver per kg are available from 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/antwerp.xls  
Berlin, 1624-1914 
Source: Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 44 (1935), 
pp. 319-321. Reichsmark/1000kg. Average market prices for calendar 
years, based on monthly average prices. The mark was on a gold 
standard, 2790 Mark equalled 1 kilogram of gold. Silver prices were 
obtained using the gold-silver price ratio given at 
http://www.measuringworth.com/gold/  
Bilboa, 1700-1826 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
207. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Bordeaux, 1700-1825 
Source for 1700-1824: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-
27, Vol. XVI, pp. 72-73. Source for 1825-1913: Drame et al; Un Siecle se 
Commerce du Ble en France, available at  
http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/prices/France/prices.html.  
Boulogne-sur-Mer, 1700-1825 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
72-73. 
Bremen, 1770-1825 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
149-150.  
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Cologne, 1816-1913 
Source: Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 44 (1935), 
pp. 296-299. Original prices in Reichsmark/1000kg. The mark was on a 
gold standard, 2790 Mark equalled 1 kilogram of gold. Silver prices were 
obtained using the gold-silver price ratio given at 
http://www.measuringworth.com/gold/. 
Copenhagen, 1750-1800 
Source: Friis and Glamann, ‘A History of Prices and Wages in Denmark 
1660-1800’. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-
Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm. 
Coruña, 1700-1826 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
67-9. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Dresden, 1750-1824 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
444. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Eton, 1600-1816 
Source: Mitchell, ‘Abstract of British Historical Statistics’, pp. 484-487. 
Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm. 
Exeter, 1620-1900 
Source for 1620-1799: Mitchell, ‘Abstract of British Historical Statistics’, 
pp. 484-487. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the 
Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm. 
Source for 1800-1900: Jacks, ‘What drove the nineteenth century 
commodity market integration’; monthly data available from 
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http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/publications/publications.html. Annual 
prices calculated as simple average of monthly prices. 
Gdansk, 1703-1815 
Source: Furtak, F., Ceny w Gdansk w Latach, 1701-1815 (Lwow, 1935). 
Prices in grams of silver per litre are available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/gdansk.xls. 
Hamburg, 1736-1913 
Source for 1736-1825: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-
27, Vol. XVI, pp. 148-149. Source for 1826-1913: Vierteljahreshefte zur 
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 44 (1935), pp. 296-299. Original prices in 
Reichsmark/1000kg. The mark was on a gold standard, 2790 Mark 
equalled 1 kilogram of gold. Silver prices were obtained using the gold-
silver price ratio given at http://www.measuringworth.com/gold/  
Königsberg, 1700-1913 
Source for 1700-1825: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-
27, Vol. XVI, pp. 146-147. Source for 1826-1913: Vierteljahreshefte zur 
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 44 (1935), pp. 296-299. Original prices in 
Reichsmark/1000kg. The mark was on a gold standard, 2790 Mark 
equalled 1 kilogram of gold. Silver prices were obtained using the gold-
silver price ratio given at http://www.measuringworth.com/gold/  
Lisbon, 1750-1855 
Source: Coruche, A questao Monetaria. Reis/hl, calendar years. Available 
from David Jacks at 
http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/prices/Iberia/Lisbon,%20Wheat,%201728-
1893,%20annual.xls 
Litre/kg conversion as noted above. For the currency conversion: Grams 
Ag/Reis available at http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/files/Portugal_1750-1855.xls  
London, 1800-1900 
Source: Jacks, ‘What drove the nineteenth century commodity market 
integration’; monthly data available from 
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http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/publications/publications.html. Annual 
prices calculated as simple average of monthly prices.  
Paris, 1600-1914 
Source: Hauser, Recherches et Documents, pp. 173-77. Prices in grams 
of silver per kg are available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Rennes, 1740-1786 
Source: Henri, ‘Recherches et documents sur l'histoire des prix en 
France’, pp. 291-4. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from 
the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Rotterdam, 1769-1925 
Source: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1826-27, Vol. XVI, pp. 
170. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Toulouse, 1600-1913 
Source for 1600-1792: Frêche, Les prix des grains, pp. 85-91. 
Centimes/hl., monthly prices. Annual average prices in grams Ag/litre are 
available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm. Litre/kg 
conversion for wheat as noted above. 
Source for 1806-1913: Drame, Silvie, et al., Un siècle de commerce. 
Centimes/hl., biweekly market prices. I calculated average annual prices 
for calendar years from the monthly prices of this dataset provided by 
David Jacks in Dollars/100kg at 
http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/prices/France/prices.html. The silver 
contents of the dollar are also his. 
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Utrecht, 1668-1772 
Source: Sillem, ‘Tabellen van Marktprijzen van Utrecht’. Prices in grams 
of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Windsor, 1700-1801 
Source: Ashton ‘Economic Fluctuation in England 1700-1800’, pp. 181-
82. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Winchester, 1620-1816 
Source: Mitchell, ‘Abstract of British Historical Statistics’, pp. 484-487. 
Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
 
 
Landlocked Europe 
Appenzell, 1756-1810 
Spelt prices. Source: Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am Bodensee. pp. 480-
84. Gulden/hl, average market prices for calendar years. Litre/kg 
conversion as noted above (using wheat). Silver content of the gulden 
from W. Tijms at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~nahi  
Augsburg, 1745-1820 
Source: Elsas, Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Lohne in 
Deutschland, Vol. I. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from 
the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Basle, 1751-1797 
Rye prices. Source: Hanauer, Etudes économiques, vol. II, pp 82-6. 
Grams Ag per litre, calendar years. Conversion into grams Ag/kg using a 
conversion of 72kg/100litre proposed by Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am 
Bodensee. p. 486. 
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Bern, 1739-1914 
Spelt prices. Source: Pfister, BERNHIST. Average market prices for 
calendar years based on monthly prices. New Swiss francs/100kg. 
Conversion to Grams Ag/kg: Körner, Währungsbewertung. 
Frankfurt, 1733-1799 
Source: Elsas, Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Lohne in 
Deutschland, Vol. I. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from 
the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Geneva, 1820-1900 
Source: Brugger, Statistisches Handbuch, pp. 320-1, 326-332. Swiss 
franc/100kg, average prices for calendar years, based on weekly market 
prices. Conversion to Grams Ag/kg: Körner, Währungsbewertung. 
Grenoble, 1600-1780 
Source: Hauser, Recherches et Documents, pp. 365-369. Prices in grams 
of silver per kg are available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Krakow, 1749-1914 
Sources: Tomaszewski, Ceny w Krakowie; Gorkiewicz, Ceny w Krakowie. 
Grams Ag/litre, calendar years. Available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/krakow.xls. Conversion into 
grams Ag/kg using a conversion (for wheat) of  76kg/100litre proposed by 
Brugger, Statistisches Handbuch, pp. 306. 
Lausanne, 1674-1902 
Source for 1674-1719: Radeff, ‘Le prix des céréales à Lausanne de 1550 
à 1720‘, pp. 15-19. Florin Lausannois/quarteron, average institutional 
prices for harvest years. 1 quarteron = 13.7 l. Litre/kg conversion for 
wheat as noted above. Source for 1700-1802: Chevallaz, Aspects de 
l'agriculture, pp. 140-3. Batzen/quarteron. Average market prices for 
calendar years. Source for 1803-1902: Brugger, Statistisches Handbuch, 
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pp. 320-1, 326-332. Swiss franc/100kg, average market prices for 
calendar years, based on weekly market prices. 
For the currency conversion to Grams Ag/kg: Körner, 
Währungsbewertung, and Körner et al., Währungen und Sortenkurse.  
Lucerne, 1601-1900 
Spelt prices. Source: Haas-Zumbühl, ‘Die Kernenpreise‘, pp. 370-372. 
Swiss francs/100kg, calendar years. Based on different sources, most 
recording average market prices and some recording average institutional 
prices. For the currency conversion to Grams Ag/kg: Körner, 
Währungsbewertung. 
Lwow, 1800-1914 
Source: Hoszowski, Ceny we Lwowie w Latach 1701-1914. Prices in 
grams of silver per kg are available from the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Madrid, 1600-1774 
Source for 1600-1650: Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price 
Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650. 
Source for 1650-1774: Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain, 1650-1800. 
Prices in grams of silver per kg are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Munich, 1650-1913 
Source for 1700-1800: Seuffert, Statistik, p. 123. Kreuzer/Schäffel. 
Average market prices for calendar years, based on average monthly 
prices. 1 Schäffel = 362 l; Litre/kg conversion for wheat as noted above. 1 
gulden = 60 kreuzer = 240 pfenning. The silver content of the pfennig is 
from David Jacks at 
http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/data/prices/Metals/Silver%20content%20of%20
currencies,%201258-1979,%20annual.xls  Source for 1800-1914: Jacobs 
and Richter, ‘Die Grosshandelspreise‘. Reichsmark/1000kg. Average 
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wholesale prices for calendar years. For the currency conversions see 
Berlin. 
Schaffhausen, 1700-1880 
Spelt prices. Source for 1700-1800: Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am 
Bodensee. pp. 480-84. Gulden/hl, average market prices for calendar 
years. Litre/kg conversion as noted above (using wheat). Silver content of 
the gulden from W. Tijms at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~nahi Source for 1800-
1880: Brugger, Statistisches Handbuch, pp. 349-50. Swiss francs/100kg. 
Calendar years, but no average price; prices based on ‘Martinischlag’. 
For currency conversions see Lucerne. 
St Gall, 1814-1904 
Source: Brugger, Statistisches Handbuch, pp. 313-14. Swiss 
francs/100kg. Calendar years. For currency conversions see Lucerne. 
Strasbourg, 1600-1875 
Source: Hanauer, Etudes économiques sur l'Alsace, vol 2 pp. 91-101. 
Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from the Allen-Unger 
database at http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Überlingen, 1719-1907 
Source for 1719-1810: Göttmann, Getreidemarkt am Bodensee. pp. 480-
84. Spelt prices. Gulden/hl, average market prices for harvest years. 
Litre/kg conversion for spelt as noted above. Silver content of the gulden 
from W. Tijms at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~nahi Source for 1820-1902: 
Vögele, Getreidemärkte am Bodensee, Anhang 2, pp. 233-4. Rye prices. 
Mark/Doppelzentner, average market prices for calendar years. For 
currency conversions, see Berlin. 
Vienna, 1700-1913 
Source: Pribram, vol. 1, pp. 371-373. Kreuzer/Metzen, annual average 
market prices for calendar years, based mostly on weekly prices 
(‘Markttage’). Prices in grams Ag/litre available at 
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http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/krakow.xls. Litre/kg conversion 
for wheat as noted above. 
Würzburg, 1752-1799 
Source: Elsas, Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Lohne in 
Deutschland, Vol. I. Prices in grams of silver per litre are available from 
the Allen-Unger database at 
http://www.history.ubc.ca/unger/htm_files/new_grain.htm 
Warsaw, 1800-1913 
Source: Siegel, Ceny w Warsawie w Latach 1816-1914. Prices in grams 
Ag/litre available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/studer/warsaw.xls. Litre/kg 
conversion for wheat as noted above. 
Zurich, 1600-1877 
Spelt prices. Source: Müller, Joh. Heinrich Waser, pp. 50, 52. 
Francs/100kg. For the currency conversions see Lucerne.  
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